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Abstract—In this paper, we analyze the achievable secrecy
rates in the two-hop wiretap channel with four nodes, where
the transmitter and the receiver have multiple antennas while
the relay and the eavesdropper have only a single antenna each.
The relay is operating in amplify-and-forward mode and all
the channels between the nodes are known perfectly by the
transmitter. We discuss different transmission and protection
schemes like artificial noise (AN). Furthermore, we introduce
interference neutralization (IN) as a new protection scheme. We
compare the different schemes regarding the high-SNR slope
and the high-SNR power offset and illustrate the performance by
simulation results. It is shown analytically as well as by numerical
simulations that the high SNR performance of the proposed IN
scheme is better than the one of AN.
Index Terms—Secrecy rate, two-hop wiretap channel, artificial
noise, amplify-and-forward, interference neutralization
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless networks are widely-used for communication
nowadays. In order to secure the conversation over this broad-
cast media, secrecy on the physical layer has been investigated
over the past few years. The research is based on the seminal
work [1], which describes how to achieve secrecy on the
discrete and degraded wiretap channel without the use of
cryptography. This work was extended in [2] to the degraded
Gaussian wiretap channel and in [3] to the non-degraded case,
which is of special interest for all wireless communication
models. For a comprehensive overview on the topic of secrecy
on the physical layer we refer the reader to [4], [5] and [6].
In cooperative communications, the wiretapper has usually
access to multiple signal transmissions. Hence the chance
of eavesdropping messages is increased. However, the coop-
erative nodes could also help to confuse the eavesdropper.
Because of this tradeoff, the multihop scenario is interesting
yet difficult. One of the first papers on secrecy in relay
wiretap channels is [7]. Here, the authors analyze the impact
of amplify-and-forward (AF) and decode-and-forward (DF)
strategies at the relay on the achievable secrecy rate in a single-
input single-output (SISO) relay wiretap channel. Additionally,
the results are compared to the case where the relay only
functions as a helper and sends artificial noise (AN). In [8]
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and [9], these relay strategies are further analyzed with regard
to the outage performance and optimal power allocation, if the
channels to the eavesdropper are known only statistically.
The extension to the relay network with multiple relays
and multiple eavesdroppers is done in [10]. In this paper, the
authors derive an optimal power allocation for maximizing the
secrecy rate under a global power constraint.
The optimization of secrecy rates in the four node two-
hop wiretap channel, where there is no direct link between
the transmitter and the receiver, is investigated in [11]. In this
paper, the relay is working in DF mode and the source and the
relay are sending AN signals, which are known a priori by the
relay and the destination. Therefore, this transmission scheme
equals a cryptographic encryption, as the AN is functioning as
key, which has to be exchanged securely before transmission.
The achievable secrecy rates in the multiple-input multiple-
output (MIMO) channel model, where every node has multiple
antennas, are determined in [12]. All nodes are working in half
duplex mode and therefore, the communication from Alice
to Bob is taking two time slots. The authors proposed the
idea, that Bob may send AN during the first phase in order to
confuse Eve. Additionally, Alice splits her power to send the
data signal and an AN signal.
Interference Neutralization (IN) is a technique to cancel in-
terference or a signal at a specific receiver, under the condition
that the signal has to travel over a relay. This technique was
applied to deterministic interference relay networks [13], two-
hop relay channels [14] and instantaneous relay networks [15].
In our paper, we use the advantage of multiple antennas
at the transmitter in order to secure the first phase of the
communication between Alice and Bob by beamforming. In
the second phase, we apply AN and IN and compare our
results with regards to the high-SNR power offset.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the system
model is presented and the high-SNR measures used for the
analysis are introduced. Section III contains the descriptions
of the different transmission and protection schemes and a
discussion about there performance in the high SNR regime.
The analytically derived results are illustrated by numerical
simulations in Section IV. Section V concludes the paper.
Throughout this paper, we use the following notations if
not stated otherwise. Vectors and matrices are marked as bold
lower and upper case letters, respectively. XH denotes the
Hermitian transpose of matrix X . | · | and ‖ · ‖ represent
the absolute value of a scalar and the Euclidean norm of a
vector, respectively. The identity matrix of rank n is denoted
by In. Π
⊥
X is the orthogonal projector onto the orthogonal
complement of the column space of X , i.e., Π⊥X = I − ΠX
where ΠX = X(X
HX)−1XH .
[·]+ describes the max-function max{·, 0}. The expectation
is noted by E[·] and all logarithms are to the base 2.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. System Model
The system considered in this paper is based on the non-
degraded Gaussian wiretap channel described in [2]. The
transmitter Alice wants to send a confidential message over
a relay to the intended receiver Bob, while the eavesdropper
Eve tries to decode this message. Therefore, we have a four
node relay network without direct link between Alice and Bob
as illustrated in Figure 1. The relay and the eavesdropper are
equipped with a single antenna each while Alice and Bob
have nT and nR antennas, respectively. The receiver does not
necessarily need multiple antennas, i.e. nR ≥ 1. The channels
from the transmitter to the relay and the eavesdropper are
denoted by hR and hE , respectively. The channels from the
relay to the destination and the eavesdropper are then labeled
as gD and gE . All nodes are operating in half duplex mode
and therefore can either transmit or receive signals.
We assume individual power constraints at the transmit
nodes, denoted by PS,1 = E[|x|2] (first phase), PS,2 =
E[|xn|2] (second phase) at the source Alice and PR at the
relay. We assume perfect channel state information (CSI) at
the transmitter, i.e., Alice has perfect knowledge about all
channels. Bob needs to have local CSI in order to maximize his
receive signal by applying maximum ratio combining (MRC).
The received signals at the relay and the eavesdropper in
the first phase are given by
yR = h
H
RwS,1x+ nR and
yE,1 = h
H
EwS,1x+ nE,1,
respectively. Accordingly, the received signals in the second
phase at the destination and the eavesdropper are given by
yD =
√
αwHDgD(h
H
RwS,1x+ nR) + nD and
yE,2 = h
H
EwS,2xn +
√
αgE(h
H
RwS,1x+ nR) + nE,2,
respectively, where α is the scaling factor at the relay to satisfy
the power constraint.
The scalars nD, nR, nE,1, and nE,2 are additive white
complex Gaussian noise with zero mean and variance σ2. The
inverse noise power is denoted by ρ = 1
σ2
. The scalar xn is a
signal sent by the source in order to protect the main signal x,
e.g., interference neutralization or artificial noise signals. The
vectors wS,1 and wS,2 are the transmit beamforming vectors
at Alice in the first and second phase, respectively. The receive
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Figure 1. System model
beamforming vector at the intended receiver Bob in the second
phase is given by wD.
The secrecy rate is then
RS = [C(ΓD)− C(ΓE)]+ , (1)
where we define C(SINR) = log (1 + SINR). The SINR
expressions are given according to the received signals as
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(3)
with α = ρPR
ρPS,1|hHRwS,1|2+1
.
In (3), the two observations made by the eavesdropper
can be identified. In the first term, we see the transmitted
signal from the first phase, where Alice sends with power
PS,1 and transmit beamforming vector wS,1. The second
term corresponds to the second transmission phase. Here, the
eavesdropper gets the data signal over the relay, which is
then disturbed by the protection signal sent by Alice and the
amplified noise from the relay.
B. High-SNR Slope and High-SNR Power Offset
In order to compare our different schemes in the high-SNR
regime, we use the concept of the high-SNR power offset from
[16]. The achievable rate as a function of the SNR ρ is denoted
by R(ρ). Then the high-SNR slope is defined as
S∞ = lim
ρ→∞
R(ρ)
log(ρ)
(4)
in bits/s/Hz/(3 dB) and the high-SNR power offset is given as
L∞ = lim
ρ→∞
(
log(ρ)− R(ρ)S∞
)
(5)
in 3 dB units.
In the high SNR regime, the throughput behaves like
R(ρ) = S∞
(
ρ[dB]
3[dB] − L∞
)
+O(1). For more detailed insights,
see [16, Section II].
The high-SNR power offset is useful in order to compare
two systems with the same high-SNR slope S∞ with regard
to there shifted throughput curves at high SNR.
III. TRANSMISSION AND PROTECTION SCHEMES
Alice performs single-stream beamforming and transmits
the intended signal with full transmit power. We define the
following beamforming vectors
wMRC =
gD
‖gD‖
, w⊥Eve =
Π⊥hEhR
∥
∥Π⊥hEhR
∥
∥
,
wMRTRelay =
hR
‖hR‖
, wEve =
ΠhEhR
‖ΠhEhR‖
,
wMRTEve =
hE
‖hE‖
, wLBF(λ) =
√
λw⊥Eve +
√
1− λwEve,
where wMRC is the maximum ratio combining (MRC) receive
beamforming vector at Bob. The vectors wMRTRelay and w
MRT
Eve are
the maximum ratio transmission (MRT) beamforming vectors
in the directions of hR and hE , respectively, applied at Alice.
The zero forcing (ZF) transmit beamforming vector regarding
Eve is given by w⊥Eve, i.e., the signal is sent in the direction
of the projection of hR onto the null space of hE , and the
vector wEve is the beamforming vector in the direction of the
projection of hR onto hE . The vector w
LBF denotes the linear
combination between the beamforming vectors w⊥Eve and wEve,
where λ ∈ [0, 1] has to be chosen appropriately.
In all following schemes the best Bob can do in order to
maximize his receive signal is MRC. This is due to the facts
that Bob is only interested in the signal coming from the relay
and that the channel is a SIMO link. Therefore, we set wD =
wMRC for all schemes.
A. Peaceful System
In the peaceful system, Eve is not present. Therefore,
we have a normal two-hop channel, where Alice wants to
maximize her transmission rate to Bob.
The optimal transmit strategy in this system is MRT, i.e.,
wS,1 = w
MRT
Relay. The secrecy capacity is therefore given as
RP = C
(
αρPS,1‖gD‖2‖hR‖2
α‖gD‖2 + 1
)
(6)
with α = ρPR
ρPS,1‖hR‖2+1
.
The high-SNR slope of the peaceful system is given by
SP∞ = 1.
The high-SNR power offset is then calculated to
LP∞ = log
(
1
PS,1‖hR‖2
+
1
PR‖gD‖2
)
. (7)
B. Eavesdropper System
In this system, the eavesdropper Eve is present, but Alice
is using only beamforming in order to protect the communi-
cation, i.e., no additional jamming signal is sent and therefore
PS,2 = 0.
The SINR terms are then given by
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and α = ρPR
ρPS,1|hHRwS,1|2+1
.
The optimal transmit beamforming vector is given by
wS,1 = w
LBF(λ) for a certain λ ∈ [0, 1].
Unfortunately, the high-SNR slope of this transmission
scheme is always zero. To overcome this disadvantage, we
need additional mechanisms to protect the communication
in the second phase. In the following, we will present two
different protection schemes. For both of these schemes it is
advantageous to choose wS,1 = w
⊥
Eve, i.e., zero forcing (ZF)
in the first phase, so that the signal at Eve is set to zero.
C. Eavesdropper System with Artificial Noise
In this setting, Alice transmits in the first phase the data
symbol with ZF as described before, i.e., wS,1 = w
⊥
Eve. In
the second phase, she additionally sends an AN signal in the
direction of Eve, i.e., wS,2 = w
MRT
Eve . The SINR terms are
given accordingly as
ΓD =
αρPS,1‖gD‖2
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∣
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⊥
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, (8)
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(9)
with α = ρPR
ρPS,1|hHRw⊥Eve|2+1
.
We achieve the achievable secrecy rate if we combine (8)
and (9) with (1). By applying this secrecy rate to (4), we obtain
the high-SNR slope
SAN∞ = 1. (10)
Similarly, by the usage of (10) and the secrecy rate together
with (5), we receive the high-SNR power offset
LAN∞ = log



1
PS,1
∣
∣
∣h
H
Rw
⊥
Eve
∣
∣
∣
2 +
1
PR‖gD‖2
+
PR |gE |2
PS,2‖hE‖2



1
PS,1
∣
∣
∣h
H
Rw
⊥
Eve
∣
∣
∣
2 +
1
PR‖gD‖2






. (11)
D. Eavesdropper System with Interference Neutralization
Due to the fact, that the transmitter has perfect channel state
information of all channels in the system, Alice can construct
a signal xn, that fulfills
−
√
αgEh
H
Rw
⊥
Evex = h
H
EwS,2xn
and therefore neutralizes the eavesdropped signal at Eve that
she receives over the relay in the second phase. This method
is known as interference neutralization (IN) in the literature.
Alice chooses ZF as beamforming strategy in the first phase,
in order to prevent Eve from eavesdropping. In the second
phase, she sends the IN signal, i.e.,
xn = −
√
αgEh
H
Rw
⊥
Eve
hHEwS,2
x.
Alice chooses the transmit beamforming vector in this phase
such that the transmission of the neutralization signal at Eve
is maximized, i.e., wS,2 = w
MRT
Eve .
The secrecy rate is then given by
RINS = C

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αρPS,1‖gD‖2
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2
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

,
where α = ρPR
ρPS,1|hHRw⊥Eve|2+1
.
As this scheme implies that Eve gets no data signal at
all, Alice can perform conventional channel coding instead
of the more complex secrecy binning that is normally used
for wiretap systems.
Unfortunately, this scheme does not work under any condi-
tion, but is dependent on the power usage at the relay and /
or on the power constraint at the transmitter. In the following,
we derive an adaptive power constraint for Alice. Alternatively,
we can optimize the power allocation at the relay as shown in
Section III-D2.
1) Adaptation of Power Constraint at Alice: In order to
successfully neutralize the signal at the eavesdropper, Alice
has to transmit with PS,2, which has to fulfill the following
inequality.
Ex
[
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αPS,1 |gE |2
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We assume individual power constraints in the first and second
phase and set, without loss of generality, PS,1 = PS,2 = PS .
Therefore. the inequality can be written as
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The power constraint per phase at Alice has to be at least
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0 otherwise
in order to successfully cancel the receive signal at the
eavesdropper Eve.
This result implies that there are cases where Alice needs
infinite power to successfully eliminate the signal at Eve. As
this is not realistic in general, we optimize the power allocation
at the relay instead.
2) Optimizing the Power Allocation at the Relay: If we
permit the relay to transmit not only with full power, but
also with a fraction of the maximal available power PR, i.e.,
0 ≤ pR ≤ PR, the power constraint for the IN can be met.
Therefore, we can formulate a maximization problem over the
transmit power at the relay subject to the IN power constraint
as follows
max
0≤pR≤PR
ρpRPS,1‖gD‖2
∣
∣
∣h
H
Rw
⊥
Eve
∣
∣
∣
2
pR‖gD‖2 +
(
PS,1
∣
∣
∣h
H
Rw
⊥
Eve
∣
∣
∣
2
+ 1
ρ
)
s.t
ρpRPS,1 |gE |2
∣
∣
∣h
H
Rw
⊥
Eve
∣
∣
∣
2
(
ρPS,1
∣
∣
∣h
H
Rw
⊥
Eve
∣
∣
∣
2
+ 1
)
‖hE‖2
≤ PS,2.
(12)
We can reformulate the IN power constraint to
pR ≤
PS,2‖hE‖2
|gE |2



1 +
1
ρPS,1
∣
∣
∣h
H
Rw
⊥
Eve
∣
∣
∣
2



.
Let us denote p̃R :=
PS,2‖hE‖
2
|gE |
2
(
1 + 1
ρPS,1|hHRw⊥Eve|2
)
. The
secrecy rate RINS is maximized for pR = min (p̃R, PR).
Therefore, we have to distinguish two different cases for the
calculation of the high-SNR slope and the high-SNR power
offset.
a) First case p̃R < PR: For this case the transmit power
at the relay is bounded by the IN power constraint and the
secrecy rate is given by
RINS (p̃R) = C
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The high-SNR slope (4) for RINS (p̃R) is given by
SIN∞(p̃R) = 1
and the high-SNR power offset (5) can be calculated to
LIN∞(p̃R) = log



1
PS,1
∣
∣
∣h
H
Rw
⊥
Eve
∣
∣
∣
2 +
|gE|2
PS,2‖hE‖2‖gD‖2



(13)
b) Second case p̃R ≥ PR: If the power at the relay is
limited by the power constraint PR, the secrecy rate is given
by
RINS (PR) = C
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Once again, the high-SNR slope is calculated to
SIN∞(PR) = 1
and the high-SNR power offset is given by
LIN∞(PR) = log
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E. Comparison of High-SNR Power Offsets
Let us now take a closer look on the three schemes, where
the high-SNR slope equals one, i.e., the peaceful system, the
eavesdropper system with AN and the eavesdropper system
with IN, and compare the high-SNR power offset expressions.
Comparing the expression for the peaceful system (7) and
the one for the eavesdropper system with IN when the system
is limited by the transmit power constraint at the relay (14),
we find, that they only differ in the first term. In the peaceful
system the transmitter uses MRT to send the data signal to the
relay, while in the IN protected system the transmitter has to
use ZF, which results in the power offset difference.
Similar observations can be made, if we compare the
eavesdropper system with AN (11) with the peaceful system
(7). Again, the first term only differs in the transmission
strategy at Alice, while the second term is identical. However,
the AN protected scheme has in addition the same terms scaled
by the ratio
PR|gE |
2
PS,2‖hE‖2
, which is the power forwarded by the
relay in direction of Eve divided by the jamming power at
Alice in direction of Eve.
This ratio is again visible, if we have a look at the eaves-
dropper system with IN limited by the IN power constraint.
These observations are expressed analytically in the follow-
ing proposition.
Proposition 1. The difference in high-SNR power offset be-
tween the peaceful system and the eavesdropper system with
IN is given by
∆L∞ = log




(
PR‖gD‖2 + PS,1‖hR‖2
)
∣
∣
∣h
H
Rw
⊥
Eve
∣
∣
∣
2
(
PR‖gD‖2 + PS,1
∣
∣
∣h
H
Rw
⊥
Eve
∣
∣
∣
2
)
‖hR‖2




if the transmit power at the relay is limited by the IN power
constraint or
∆L∞ = log
(
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(
PS,1|hHRw⊥Eve|2|gE |2+PS,2‖gD‖2‖hE‖2
)
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)
if the transmit power is limited by the transmit power con-
straint PR.
The proof is omitted due to space limitations.
Remark 1. In the case where the transmit power at the relay
is limited by the IN power constraint, the high-SNR power
offset difference gets zero, i.e., ∆L∞ = 0, iff w⊥Eve = wMRTRelay,
i.e., the channels hR and hE are orthogonal.
Furthermore, the protection scheme with AN dependents
on the channel realizations and the SNR, as can be seen from
following proposition.
Proposition 2. For the eavesdropper system with AN, the
achievable secrecy rates becomes positive if
ρ ≥ |gE|
2 − ‖gD‖2
PS,2‖gD‖2‖hE‖2
.
The proof is straightforward and therefore omitted.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
For the simulations, we used a geometric channel model
with a path loss coefficient of a = 2. The nodes were placed
on a 20 by 20 grid with the following positions:
Alice: [04 10] Bob: [16 10]
Relay: [10 12] Eve: [10 07]
The channels were generated randomly and weighted by the
distances between the nodes.
The transmitter was equipped with four antennas, while the
receiver had only two antennas. The power constraints at the
transmitter and the relay were set to PS,1 = PS,2 = PR = 10
dB. In the case of IN, the power at the relay was adapted to
the constraints in (12).
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Figure 2. Rates in the 2-hop wiretap channel over the SNR.
The figures show the instantaneous achievable secrecy rates
for the peaceful system according to (6) denoted by Rp and the
two protection schemes IN, as introduced in Section III-D and
labeled as RINS , and AN, described in Section III-C denoted
by RANS . Additionally, the figures show the achievable secrecy
rates RLBFS , R
ZF
S and R
MRT
S , which are derived by the rate
expressions in Section III-B with beamforming vectors wLBF,
w⊥Eve and w
MRT
Relay, respectively. In Figure 2, we used channel
realizations, where the link between Alice and the relay is
better than the other links:
|hR|2 =




0.0002
0.0001
0.0008
0.0015




, |hE |2 =




0.0002665
0.0002332
0.0000017
0.0007034




,
|gD|2 =
[
0.0000461
0.0004659
]
, and |gE |2 = 0.00016337
It can be seen, that both protection schemes have the same
slope as the peaceful system. Furthermore, the IN protected
scheme is almost as good as the peaceful system and better
than the AN protected scheme. Due to the missing protection
of the data signal in the second phase, the three beamforming
schemes perform badly in the high SNR regime. This can be
seen even better in Figure 3.
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Figure 3. Rates in the 2-hop wiretap channel over the SNR.
For Figure 3, the channel gains were such that the link
between the relay and the eavesdropper was advantageous:
|hR|2 =




0.0003638
0.0000578
0.0009261
0.0002946




, |hE |2 =




0.0006966
0.0001848
0.0000114
0.0001544




,
|gD|2 =
[
0.0004682
0.0006272
]
, and |gE |2 = 0.0065
Due to the worse channel between Alice and Eve, Alice
has not enough power to send the IN signal and the power
at the relay has to be decreased in order to meet the IN
power constraint. This results in a lower transmission rate to
Bob and therefore also a lower secrecy rate. For the same
reason, the AN scheme performs even worse, as the AN signal
disturbs Eve not enough. Furthermore, the AN rate is zero for
ρ < 26.7325 and gets positive values for ρ ≥ 26.7325, as
stated in Proposition 2. For these special channel realizations,
all beamforming rates are zero, as the effective channel from
Alice over the relay to Eve is better than the effective channel
from Alice over the relay to Bob.
V. SUMMARY
In this paper, we analyzed achievable secrecy rates in the
MISO two-hop wiretap channel with four nodes, where the
relay is operating in amplify-and-forward mode and all the
links between the nodes are known perfectly. We discussed
different transmission and protection schemes and introduced
interference neutralization as a new protection scheme. We
showed, that the interference neutralization scheme has the
lowest power offset compared to the peaceful system and
outperforms AN.
Future work will include the analysis of the influence of
imperfect channel state information.
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